

ACADEMY OF PERFORMING ARTS IN PRAGUE

FILM AND TV SCHOOL

Photography

BACHELOR'S THESIS

The semiotic self in a digital ideological machine.

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Examiner:

Date of thesis defense:

Academic title granted: BcA.

Prague, 2021

AKADEMIE MÚZICKÝCH UMĚNÍ V PRAZE

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Datum obhajoby:

Přidělovaný akademický titul: BcA.

Praha, 2021

D e c l a r a t i o n

I declare that I have prepared my **Bachelor's Thesis/Master's Thesis** independently on the following topic:

Semiotics, psychotherapy and ontology

under the expert guidance of my thesis advisor and with the use of the cited literature and sources.

Prague, date: 28/4/2021..... Signature..... *Niels Erhardson*.....

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Ve své diplomové práci bych také chtěl rozluštit, co se děje v prchavém okamžiku, kdy se symbolický řád zkreslí postmoderní teorií o subjektu / já Badiou, která tvrdí, že já nebo jak to řekl „situace“ určuje naše jednání abychom se připojili k akci, místo abychom vytvořili vlastní akci. Tento bod mi připadá zajímavý, protože opojná část digitální říše je, to je nesmírná nekonečná síla, kterou si označíte, a nikdy jste sami něco opravdu nevytvořili. Badiou nenapsal teorii, která by měla na mysli digitální, ale použitím této teorie pak postmoderní člověk nějak zapadl do digitální sféry, spíše než do samotné „vnější“ reality.theory, then the postmodern human somehow fit into the digital realm, rather more than the “outside” real itself.

With my thesis I would also like to decipher what happens in the ephemeral moment where the symbolic order gets distorted with postmodern theory about the subject/self by Badiou, who claims that the selves or as he put it “situations” are determined by our action to join action rather than create our own action. This point I find interesting since the intoxicating part of the digital realm is that it is an immense endless force that you tag along, and never truly create something yourself. Badiou didn't write the theory having the digital in mind, but by using that theory, then the postmodern human somehow fits into the digital realm, rather more than the “outside” real itself.

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Introduction

“We sometimes treat some technologies as if they have minds, and some technologies are designed with interfaces that encourage or require that users treat them as if they have minds”

Is a quote from *D. E. Wittkower* in his paper “ **What Is It Like to Be a Bot** ” where he addresses the matter of our humans’ relationship to 21st century technology. Nowadays companies design and develop interfaces that produce technologies that give the illusion of a technology that is trying to assimilate human interaction. Some of these technologies are built into products that become domestic devices. It will seem like that it will like to get to know us. It can ask us questions or we can ask it questions. We can ask it to remember things and it reminds us.

The device builds slowly a relation towards us and we build up a relation towards it as well because the device can interact with us or we can interact with it as well, by the trigger of our voice. The possibility of communication with a human voice interaction gives the device a quality a credibility, giving the device humanlike attributes. Such projection of humanlike attributes towards device is not a new phenomena, look at for an example Siri. MacBook and iPhone users, can build up an irritation toward Siri and exclaim dissatisfaction with “her” if she pops up, in a stressed situation and they want the application to go, and says for an example “not now Siri” a remark mostly used in the realm of one-to-one dialog between live species. By giving this application a human name and a voice, the user becomes accustomed to it by calling it “her” since it seems more “natural” since the app has so many humanlike attributes. This illusion can easily be dismantled, since the app allows the user to take voice from her. This does not go for Alexa. Her voice is the premise of the device.

Since we have an abundance of technologies that have the possibility to be controlled by Bluetooth, the device can be connected to the voice, so that we

don't have to use our smartphone. This means that the device is taking over the everyday chores and minimizes the interactions we as humans have to do, regarding flicking the lights on and off and setting house alarm on and etc.

To be more precise, the name of the example of the virtual assistant AI technology device as described is called Alexa. Created by Amazon Lab126 under Amazon, the great American enterprise that has paid its way into almost everyone's life in the world in some sort and blurred the border of real life presence and online presence.

Alexa is the key example to use when we want investigate what happens in the dynamics of one-to-one relationship from one person to another and when it can transform and this transformation can go from one person to another medium, such as Alexa. When we as humans give non-living devices human attributes. The desire of this giving the device attributes comes from the dynamics. The dynamics of dialog from the person to the device and vice versa. The dynamics that will be investigated are the ones when a person emits a self-projection unto an device that contains an interface.

That dynamic creates or contains a narrative. A narrative about changing our perception of what we can interact with and a narrative where the one-to-one coherency from person to person, can transcend into multi surfaces, devices and interfaces.

The example of Alexa will be one of my key-points in my thesis and used as an anchor to drag my conclusions from other texts into it and discuss it all together. The reason for that discussion is because that in one of the other texts presented there is a very crucial theoretical claim that we as humans are very exposed to have somewhat outer body experiences, regarding disrupting the feeling of only having a one-to-one coherency and moreover towards a more fluid approach and become more like others and other become more like you. The text by Michael W.

Barclay and Michael Kee presents psychotherapeutic materials that claim that the one-to-one coherency disruption is a normal human action. That we bound to “misunderstand” and “misinterpret” each other and develop more roles because of the element of linguistic and oral interactions overall. This misunderstanding derives from a different narrative that can occur in everyday situations where a person feels that that one-to-one coherency is interrupted and they almost transcend into another person, or that they feel like the other person’s attributes is a part of them. This transcendence is described by Michael W. Barclay and Michael Kee as an experience of some sort where semiotic signs can move freely from one person to another and you can feel that someone else’s features can be inside of you as well.

What can we learn from the psychotherapeutic theory connected to Alexa and the stances within?

The data from investigating the connection with the semiotic psychotherapeutic theory process that is connected to Alexa, will be used to understand, how we interact towards our perceived online digital selves and how it works in contrast to the “real” selves. I chose to work with the Alexa paper, since it gives a lot of information regarding how we as humans allow ourselves to believe that an online representation of ourselves is just as valid as our non-online self, because of our behavior towards interfaces.

I have chosen to use a last proposed theory that elaborates that this behavior is somehow normal or expected of us human, in the 21th century and I therefor use Badiou’s theory of multiplicities and multitudes in the thesis so it is better understood how the connection of the online selves is connected to the Alexa part and the psychotherapeutic part.

Keywords:

Psychotherapy, digital symbols, subjectivity/situations, real, digital real, bots, being and being, non-space.

My argument to use the psychotherapeutic journal is that the practice of psychotherapy uses semiotic processes. The psychotherapy is dedicated to understand the semiotics, verbally and psychically in the investigation for understanding the person/client to the fullest. The mechanics of semiotics can be our own perception projected unto/into others and back again. This happens also in the digital reality, but because of the lack of tactility and presence a threshold is created and in this created threshold bridges is created that go in both directions validating each other.

Methodology

Using Badiou's theory and the psychotherapeutics paper to find out how we fit into the digital realm. I will work with questions and discussions to find interpretations that could justify multiple solutions to why we fit into the digital real. The data I will get from my variables will go through an analysis then to results. The results then should create an interpretation that turns into a discussion. Last, I summarize it into a conclusion.

Part 1.1

A sign as must be interpreted

“A sign is not only something which stands for something else; it is also something can and must be interpreted”¹

Umberto Eco said regarding how meaning is transmitted or constructed. The sign is a language and can have a reference bound to things that don't exist and only exist within the moment of a dialog and to the words spoken. “ it gives existence or meaning to things that don't exist”² This is a crucial fact, regarding that we can't reproduce images that contain our past feelings, but words can trigger it instead of works of painting or photographs, therefore as signs to a cognitive process that recreates tactile ephemeral moments and can stay in us forever.

The importance of the words from a person is then highly necessary to pay notice to since they will create suitable ground for observations for the persons view into and unto themselves and the world surrounding them. The linguistics is a part of a semiotic process or coherency that is needed to be deconstructed if we want to find cognitive patterns and understand importance of cogitation of the language.

Peirce defines a semiosis as three parts

*“the sign, its object and an interpretant”*³

¹ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 672 line 40

² Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 775 line 14

³ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. page 673 line 44

and goes on to talk about the fact that the mind and the self is in a semiosis. This semiosis becomes a semiotic psychotherapeutic take that the self is in a world of signs and emphasizes semiosis as a primary function of itself.

So to keep the mind at peace, it needs to find a ground or to find signs that maintain the self. Without the signs, the mind would lack enough cognition and therefore find itself on a threshold. But what happens when the mind simply can't find the right tracks on a normal semiosis between three parts described before?

Part 1.2

The cognition principle of the language

To attain a better understanding of a clients semiosis (understanding of reality)
Peirce argues

“That the self is a symbol itself The self is a symbol, and the suggest that the subject is a metaphor, in the metaphor is the exchange of one term for another and the concept of the self is found in the interchangeability of the self and other ⁴.

Taken this into consideration of the question asked in chapter before “But what happens when the mind simply can't find the right tracks on a normal semiosis between three parts described before? The theory of psychotherapy offers an authority to interpreted what those metaphors are metaphors for.

⁴ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 674 line 7

This is created of course in a safe-space and requires suitable time and trust in the therapist. Yet, these processes happen outside of the safe-space away from client and therapist as well and metaphors are everywhere and our perception of our metaphor phenomena are not dealt with in an overall universal manner. This creates readings/mis-readings of cognitions that will produce its own realities, and inside these realities we create more sides of our selves.

Part 1.3

Personal identity itself becomes a semiotic problem

A shift happens a shift when we speak about our selves in everyday lives. As Jespersen⁵ writes that when we engage in a conversation, we naturally take stances in having an “I” and accepting the other side that gives us a “you”. This is described as transition phenomena where the reference point of pronouns moves physically and mentally from one to another. What does this phenomena create, when it comes to perception of identities ?

“Personal identity itself becomes a semiotic problem”⁶ What Jespersen says here is an interchangeability. A subject starts to see beyond the linguistic dualism of two persons and ends up having a shifting character in and of itself.

From that we understand the metaphoric (the subject) identification and see personality structure appearing from semiotic signs of other people, from example a character from tv whose traits of identity the subject starts taking into itself.

⁵ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 674 line 34

⁶ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 674 line 20

Simply put. We see the representation of the persons identity while trying to understand on which levels does the subject put its own metaphorical self identification and from what sources. It can be an distorted image, since we can't see the " self "inside the person, this issue continues with misinterpretation of the client, who sees himself in fictional characters, in film or a self persistency of believing in cognitions that can create a mistaken take on a shared reality.

A complex other, a narrative construct arising from his or her own perceptions and fantasies.

Yet, on another level, this narrative structure which is proved linguistically and in actions becomes an object in itself. This becomes a sign that demands interpretation and this interpretation becomes a sign it self and becomes an infinite process, Jespersen claims⁷.

This infinite process can be understood if therapists try to understand where the client is in the narrative and in the semiosis. Regarding clinical and medical world, these processes can be mistaken for the diagnosis Dissociative Identity ⁸Disorder since it claims that there is a one-to-one body relationship.

Going in to descriptions of the DID, we see that everything that does not go with the idea of the one-to-one coherency is either a state of neurosis or schizophrenia.

By having this fixed standard of the world and claiming that everything outside the one-to-one coherency is wrong is a strong claim, simply because linguistics are developed later than the brain, and this dynamic between the brain and the

⁷ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 675 line 35

⁸ Barclay, Kee, Michael W. Barclay, Michael Kee (2001) Towards a semiotic psychotherapy. Semiotic objects and semiotic selves. Theory & Psychology Copyright 2001 Sag Publications. Vol 11 (5) 6171-686. Page 676 line 17

linguistic is somehow impossible to have an exact scientific overall definition that covers what is going on exactly.

Part 1.4

Conclusion of part one and onto part two

So therefor there is a dynamic with the subject that makes it possible for it to shift personalities or identity traits. If a person showed any signs of personal shifting traits, it would easily be diagnosed instead of being treated as semiotic phenomena. The semiotic process acquires cognition from other people to become a sign in itself. This sign is never at a fixed position and can go into infinite processes.

That raises the question if this dynamic of the person to person semiotic identity ideology can be transferred from a person to a non-space such as on the internet? So instead of taking the traits of someone you saw on the internet or tv, you would instead give or project the traits to the non-space self instead or non-person interface?

Part 2.1

Using the bot to identifying the otherness.

“We sometimes treat some technologies as if they have minds, and some technologies are designed with interfaces that encourage or require that users treat them as if they have minds.”⁹

D.E. Wittkower puts forth an interesting observation regarding that the user is confronted with that fact they need to treat devices as if they have minds, to get the fullest out of them. To make the user believe, that these interfaces work as a mind. Of course these interfaces such as Alexa have a soothing voice and can make smart remarks so that the user feels comfortable with interface.

That is of course not a new strategy, but a psychological trait known for ages that we need to make people feel comfortable if they ought to use or buy a product.

Yet the thing with Alexa works a bit more on a human scale. Since we have to get to know her, we can do that by talking to her and the classical learning by manual is discarded and instead there is a learning by interaction.

The interaction relies on the user, and the outcome of Alexa relies on how many interactions and time the user is willing to give. To Alexa. This automatically initiates a pseudo theory of mind¹⁰ This is a giant step, to make the user adaptable to give Alexa human attributes. Attributes in the way, that the user can indulge in

⁹ D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23 - Page 1 line 21

¹⁰ D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23- Page 2 line 5

conversations and do commands. The smart folks who created Alexa, gave her humor.

That automatically creates one-to-one relationships, just as we see in Knight Rider, when the character of David Hasselhoff plays chess with his car KIT who has a female voice, and when she wins over him, she smites at him with a cheeky comment, hence building a relation between him and her.

So Alexa works as a bot, but this bot is programmed in a way, as previously described to create a coherency or relation between the user and the interface of Alexa, so that the user does not feel like that she is a mere bot. The otherness of Alexa becomes just Alexa, and her interface is not “visible” This elimination of bottoms and etc. on the Alexa, eliminates the “robot” feel of her and when she solemnly works on speech and the elimination of the otherness/robot as an obstacle for creating relation disappears, she becomes somewhat familiar. What happens exactly and is it somehow a phenomena ?

Part 2.2

Heterophenomenology and user-friendly ideology

A short description of Heterophenomenology ("phenomenology of another, not oneself") is a term coined by Daniel Dennett to describe an explicitly third-person, scientific approach to the study of consciousness and other mental phenomena.”

This will be followed by a wider consideration of relations with technological “others,” outlining a central distinction between a merely projected “other” and

those technological “others” the function of which requires that the user treat them as an “other,” rather than a mere technical artifact or system.¹¹

This quote from Wittkower pretty much sums up how we can treat Alexa. She is an Other, an Other that we can investigate with similar brackets questions of correspondence to reality in order to isolate the structure of experience. The Heterophenomenology form from Dennet has to be used, so that we can develop an understanding of what the Other is in comparison to one-to-one relationship, human to human.

Here, though, the question is not whether and to what extent experiences correspond to that of which they are experiences, but whether and to what extent experiences of the experiences of others correspond to the experiences of others.¹²

Again, a quote from Wittkower. It is important to understand the coherency of experiences for what they are in comparison to the experience. Alexa, the phenomena of the bot gives us a relief experience because I do not need to look for the manual, I can merely ask Alexa to find it and it send it to my mail or even read it out loud. I can even ask her to turn herself off.

An experience in itself is nothing we can put in an index since every experience is felt differently from person to person. Experiences are also a vast field of different things and the field they are present is always developing and as times goes by, our feeling of a past experience is changing and becomes an ephemeral moment

¹¹ D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23 - Page 2 line 12

¹² D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23 - Page 3 line 3

when we look back to how we felt about that experience and what emotion we felt back then.

Where does this put us in understanding the relationship with Alexa when we speak about metaphors regarding the linguistic realm the one-to-one. What does this relation offer us?

Part 2.3

Stances, metaphors and projecting our lives into interfaces.

We intuitively adopt an intentional stance toward many others, including non-humans, based on strong evidence. It is difficult to account for the actions of dogs and cats, for example, without attributing to them intentions and desires. In other cases, we use intentional language metaphorically as a kind of shorthand, as when we say that “water wants to find its own level.”¹³

As using this quote to begin this next paragraph, we must understand that we use stances to create either a distance or connection. Both distance or connection are as we see it with the line “water wants to find its own level.” Connected to logic. For an example, it is logical to think, that a dog cannot speak. Hence its not logical to think that a dog can speak. This in between, distance and connection logical sphere, creates a space for things to emerge, such as the metaphor, that water will find its own level as if it has its own consciousness. We are giving Alexa a logical field to grow in, since we are adapting to a surface of terms when we indulge in a speaking part within linguistic semiotic, with Alexa.

¹³ D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23- Pg. 3 line 19

Wittkower goes on to speak about one important point, the experiences with Alexa as non-experience¹⁴ It requires us, the user to understand the logic of non-minds, non-experiences. He argues that we need to accept a stance towards non-subject, but the subject is still there and exist as a subject, but in a new form. A form of non-mind subject, since we allow ourselves to talk to her and use our linguistic cognition system. We rely on her, and if she do not work, she disappoints us. That would never work with an own that would disappoint us. Alexa also knows, if she done a task wrong, and use the action of “thinking” This whole operation of understanding Alexa creates some dangers such as Wittkower describes¹⁵ *when outlining the minds we can mistake observations for our own projections*. This means that we can mistake the Alexa for a simple thing instead of its complexity, since our own projection could be that we do not know exactly how she works, so we leave it like that, and integrate our projections over her, instead of observing what she does to us, such as the changing of planning stuff, since Alexa has planning/calendar integrated.

Part 2.4

Conclusion of part two and onto part three

Yet one thing is important, that we allow non-minds with non-experiences to be a part of our life by allowing Alexa into our lives. We project our one-to-one experience away people interactions and instead into a interface by using the linguistic as a bridge or medium. We allow the interface as a part of cognition everyday lives and create a spectrum for living and non-living mediums to interact with each other. Of cause this spectrum is only kept alive by a human who wish to initiate or keep the relation to Alexa.

¹⁴ D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23- Pg. 4 line 31

¹⁵ D. E. Wittkower. (2021) **What Is It Like to Be a Bot?**.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology
Edited by Shannon Vallor.Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Jan 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.23- Pg. 6 line 35

Yet somehow, there is something double side to having a relation to non-mind object, in a normal conversational manner. As written before, that the Medical world declines any one-to-one relationships of having a relation to something outside of own body, as normal, yet the cognition of Alexa as a “person” somehow goes under the category as schizophrenic, since we enable the semiotic processes of her becoming a sign, where we accept her as something outside of our mind but also inside our mind, this leads me to the question.

How does Alexa and non-mind interfaces correlate to post-modern theory of beings, in that sense, are our projections off our own bots online (such on facebook and etc.) a non-mind or mind?

Part 3.1

The being and beings of online lives

All these phenomenas , semiotics and non-minds interfaces is somehow connected, if we put it into the context of psychotherapeutic theory and understand its normal to have one-to-one relationship with many things, even not living things. The stances are somehow a bridge that connect them. That Alexa is a mind of her own, therefore we give her an position as non-mind with mind attributes. If we look into the modern ontology, regarding the being and beings, and as the example here.¹⁶

That a football teams can be the being or the beings. Seeing the team as beings “the wildcats” got their name from being unorganized, rough and showing the claws. But if we see them as being, they are merely build up on multiplicities, skin and bone etc. Hence the name Wildcats wouldn’t be appropriate.

What is the being of this relation of being and beings if we ought to look onto Alexa and our digital selves, our online self projection since those two are

¹⁶Badiou , Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought. Truth and the return to philosophy. Continuum, (1998), reprinted 2003. P. 9 line 21

connected since we enacting communication via linguistic to both of them. *The online self projection part will be discussed in the abstract.*

The beings of Alexa is modern technological wonder, that create more space for us, in that manner, that we don't need to write down notes anymore and we just ask Alexa to turn on the radio or ask for the latest mails. The being of here is computer, made of components all hidden into a tube, relies on internet, and need regular updates etc. Clearly after allowing Alexa into our daily linguistic lives, she lie on the beings side.

Part 4.1

Discussion & Conclusion

I would like to go back to these questions asked previously, seen in context of the relationship between a person and a non-person who is online (e.g. on Facebook)

But what happens, when the mind simply can't find the right tracks on a normal semiose between three parts, described before ? "the sign, its object and an interpretant"

We know that humans have been adapting to non-minds interfaces slowly and slightly integrated the non-human side into their lives as well. Building up a relationship, but with some indication of roles. Its always the human thats in control. But as interfaces develops and know how to work and please our satisfactions, therefore also get consumed into the devices, and they almost take over, if seen in a Baudrillard's theory sense of objects and their purposes.

Just because we have the power to turn something off, necessary means that we are in control. In that sense if we still think about the device, when its turned off, we are then not in control over the device and the time consumption, we put into it.

This goes to sure, that even though we are not actively online, we would still be thinking about our online-representation. This works as a phenomena, where the premise of Alexa interaction and online life contains a semiose, that is not coherent it is original sense, but now work in a new sense.

This new semiose works with an existing phenomena, because we as humans have a multitude of perceptions regarding ourselves. We have the idea of ourselves in our own imagination and in the idea of ourselves in the imagination in other people minds etc. The only difference here is, that we have an avatar of ourselves, and a self projection, that is connected to these three parts, not in the old sense, but now in this new sense of work, as described.

So in this digital realm, the original semiotic order is dismantled and works more freely. We can look at in the psychotherapeutic sense, and see other peoples peoples profiles and profile picture stickers etc. as signs. The platform is filled with signs, going all directions, making it hard to start at some point and end at some other point. The livingness of the signs, make the online reality far from a static experience. The livingness and its abundance of the unforeseen, is a like what we assign to the real. The definition of

We have all the possible signs of the other people on the interfaces and their cognitions can be confirmed by their mere existence on the platform. So the interactions of other people is not necessary as long as you know, that you have yourself “out there”. This brings me back to the observation, that even though that you are logged off, you will still be present there.

This causes a phenomena that rises the question, towards the medical science. When the one-to-one coherency of mind and body is changing and we now have totally different constellations, that would be one-to-one outta body self projections, that do not exist in a real space but only in non-space.

The question would therefore be, if this new semiotic process is also a schizophrenic phenomena or process, since we can create some version of ourselves, that lives its own life in a non-space where there isn't any psychological tactility?

Since we live in a world where non-space has become just as valid a real space, there must be some justification for it. If we go back and see what bridges the metaphors can bring, and then take this under consideration that if the linguistic field of using metaphors/subjects grants a link between our non-online-human and online-human, it can then open up a schizophrenic part about our perceptions of identities in the in-betweens of the two parts. The online and offline personas.

So what is this, that is within the in-between. The in-between is the link and the link is the metaphors. We use the metaphors granted by our languages to enable new positions, to where we can stand and allow new realities to unfold. Unfolding of new possibilities to where our identities can be present, leaving the non-online human as an option, rather than a fixed point. The metaphors grant us liability towards our online persona, well knowing it is a device and interface. We are fully aware of it, just as we are aware that Alexa is a machine, with humanlike attributes. The reason why we see online personification as a necessity can be found in Badiou's theory.¹⁷

In order to understand how Badiou might equate these inconsistent multiplicities with being, consider stripping something of all of its properties to the extent that even its identity and unity are removed.

We, the users of the interfaces, know very well, how the Facebook structure is built up, and what kind of determination is required of us, to stay put there. But we live now in 2021, where for many months, there were no real-life human interactions, and online space were the only way to feel and see people without masks. This is of course an question of existentialism. We are fully aware of what

¹⁷ Badiou, Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought. Truth and the return to philosophy. Continuum, (1998), reprinted 2003. P.9 line 33

we see, but we allow it since there isn't any alternative. There is a revelation going on because, we stripped for all identity, when we can't present ourselves and our artifacts and objects in real life. Everything that we consist, don't exist, unless other people sees them as well. Yet, we can present them online, and they then exist, because we have shown them. People whose Instagrams accounts are influencer don't care about, if people think they are fake, and the photos are staged, that's a part of the game. But as long as the photos are developed into a common consciousness of experience, then they exist. The normal semiotic order is as described, dismantled and turned into something new. This transformation is granted, because of the lack regarding a direct strict relationship of one-to-one, and we have instead a more experimental common consciousness approach toward technology, that allow deconstruction of former linguistic stands and build new relations to devices and create human online consciousness.

De Wittkower claims, that we use metaphors to distance ourselves from the others, but when it comes to digital presentation, it somehow add to the illusion/perception of the self, when we for an example say

“ I have to see how its going on my profile and see if people are attending on Sunday”

Here we use metaphors and stances to justified for our initiating towards the non-space. This answer the question regarding.

That rises the question, if this dynamic of the person to person semiotic identity ideology can be transferred from a person to a non-space such as on the internet? So instead of taking the traits of someone you saw on the internet or tv, you would instead give or project the traits to the non-space self instead or non-person interface?

With the take on identity from Badiou¹⁸ we understand that subject is more interested in being moving through an autonomous chain of actions within a changing situation, rather than being a subject who initiate an action in an autonomous manner. So a person sitting in front of the computer, who initiates a lot of online actions, somehow finds its spot in the autonomous chain. It feels real, to be sitting there with all these people, who online acquaintance is there. We even can find traits on their online persona, such as. This person always likes my images or this person never replies etc. We therefore identify people from their actions or non-actions that gets to work inside the autonomous chain. This validate the identification of the person, as a person online.

This creates a situation where a subject from a living space, merges into the non-space and there is created a semiosis. In comparison to nowadays, in the year 2021. We can justify this semiosis more and more after one year of almost everything being digitalized, and we see ourselves daily on a digital non-space and we initiate in interactions more online than in real life. The idea that our one-to-one order is scattered and becoming something new, can be justified by Badiou's theory of identification happens via events on autonomous chains that justify that the semiotic form of

the sign, its object and an interpretant

can easily be transformed into a digital space or non-space, but in a new shape. To ask if this is Badiou's theory is used to achieve a normalization of modern self projection is maybe the wrong way to go. Maybe the digitalization and non-mind theory would have looked different, if we didn't have invasive wave of digitalization, and Badiou wrote his text in 1998. We can conclude that we can justify that our online signs is just as valid as our non-online signs even though they exist in a non-space, simply because we allow ourself to have the same dynamic with Alexa or with our online friends, as a cognition sign, and we use the linguistic bridge to connect us to the dynamic, verbally and in online written text. The autonomous chain is important to remember, because it works just as

¹⁸ Badiou , Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought. Truth and the return to philosophy. Continuum, (1998), reprinted 2003. P.5 line 6

well in real life scenario as for the online scenario. As long as we developing new dimensions of representations of realities and as long as we are using linguistics and symbols from our real life. We will then project ourself into this dimension, and this dimension becomes a valid sign of our selves.

4.2

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